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A rapid increase in maritime trafﬁc together with challenging navigation conditions and a vulnerable
ecosystem has evoked calls for improving maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea. It is
suggested that these improvements will be the result of adopting a regionally effective proactive ap-
proach to safety policy formulation and management. A proactive approach is grounded on a formal
process of identifying, assessing and evaluating accident risks, and adjusting policies or management
practices before accidents happen. Currently, maritime safety is globally regulated by internationally
agreed prescriptive rules, which are usually revised in reaction to accidents. The proactive Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA) is applied to risks common to a ship type or to a particular hazard, when deemed
necessary, whereas regional FSA applications are rare. An extensive literature review was conducted in
order to examine the opportunities for developing a framework for the GoF for handling regional risks at
regional level. Best practices were sought from nuclear safety management and ﬁsheries management,
and from a particular case related to maritime risk management. A regional approach that sees maritime
safety as a holistic system, and manages it by combining a scientiﬁc risk assessment with stakeholder
input to identify risks and risk control options, and to evaluate risks is proposed. A regional risk gov-
ernance framework can improve safety by focusing on actual regional risks, designing tailor-made safety
measures to control them, enhancing a positive safety culture in the shipping industry, and by increasing
trust among all involved.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The global economy is based on an efﬁcient transportation of
goods among countries and continents, and today over 90% of the
world's trade is transported by sea [1]. However, intense maritime
trafﬁc can have negative consequences, such as vessel accidents
potentially leading to a loss of life and cargo, and detrimental
impacts on the environment. Thus, there is an ever growing need
for maritime safety measures to prevent and mitigate harmful
consequences.
In the Gulf of Finland (GoF) in the Baltic Sea, rapidly increased
maritime trafﬁc has evoked calls for improving safety by adopting
a regionally effective proactive approach to policy formulation
[2–4]. In this context, safety refers to the absence of maritime
accidents that can cause harm to the ship/cargo, humans/societyLtd. This is an open access article u
aapasaari),and/or the environment. The risks of accidents in the GoF are seen
as high, because the environmental conditions and high trafﬁc
volumes make navigation challenging [5], and because the eco-
system of the area is very fragile [6]. A proactive approach to safety
aims at preventing disasters by anticipating future events and
adjusting policies or management practices before something
happens. This, it is argued, will save economic resources, and
prevent the loss of human live and environmental damage. As the
future is uncertain, it is, however, difﬁcult to know what kind of
disasters might happen and what kind of preparations should be
made. Thus, a proactive policy-making approach is grounded on a
formal process of identifying, assessing and evaluating accident
risks, and focusing adjustments on those risks that are evaluated
as being at an intolerable or unacceptable level.
Maritime safety in the GoF is managed basically by the same
prescriptive international regulations that are found in all the
world's seas [7]. The international regulations mainly relate to ship
conditions, construction and equipment, mariners and manage-
ment, and navigational instruments. The global rules are set downnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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gether 168 states of the world as well as non-state actors, such as
shipowners and environmental organizations, in order to achieve
general acceptance [8]. At the level of the European Union (EU),
the European Commission (EC) translates the regulations, de-
termined at the IMO, into binding laws, with the support of the
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) [9]. Further, the rules
are adapted to regional conditions by the Baltic Marine Environ-
ment Protection Commission (Helsinki Commission, HELCOM), an
intergovernmental organization of nine Baltic coastal countries
and the EU [7,10]. Finally, the regulations are implemented by
individual nations. Only in their territorial areas (up to 12 nautical
miles from the coast) do the coastal states have an extensive right
to arrange and govern issues such as piloting, Vessel Trafﬁc Ser-
vices (VTS), the maintenance of waterways and safety devices,
nautical charting, and weather, water level and ice services [11,7].
These international rules are widely regarded as the only pos-
sible way of managing safety at sea, because they ensure the
principle of the freedom of navigation, guarantee uniform safety
standards for all waters, and provide a coherent operational en-
vironment for shipping companies and seamen [11–13]. Still, the
safety regime is criticized inter alia for being ineffective, diffuse
and partial, too slow in its reactions, and incapable of addressing
local shipping conditions and satisfying the needs of the most
vulnerable sea areas [12–15]. The limitations are manifested in
efforts by individual states or regions to implement additional
safety measures in their adjacent waters [16–18,11]. Local mea-
sures are rarely supported by the IMO because they interfere with
the integrity of global navigation [19,11,7].
The international regulations are of a reactive nature, which
means that they are usually revised after major accidents have
occurred somewhere in the world [20]. In 1997, the IMO took a
step towards proactivity by inviting its member governments and
non-governmental organizations to apply formal safety assess-
ment (FSA) when deemed necessary, to support the IMO's decision
making [21]. In 2002 the IMO approved guidelines for FSA [22].
FSA is deﬁned as “a rational and systematic process for assessing
the risks relating to maritime safety and the protection of the
marine environment and for evaluating the costs and beneﬁts of
IMO's options for reducing these risks”. Since the initiative, a host
of FSA studies have been submitted to the IMO [23–25]. As the FSA
studies aim at enacting generic international regulations, they
mainly focus on risks common to a particular type of ship or ha-
zard, and rarely on risks of particular sea areas [26,27,20]. Thus,Fig. 1. The GoF covers an area of 30,000 square kilomthe recommendation given by the IMO to conduct FSA provides a
supportive, but not sufﬁcient basis for a proactive approach for the
GoF.
There is a need for a framework in the GoF that enables a
systematic process of handling regional risks at the regional level
[28,13,29]. In this paper the possibility of developing such a formal
approach is discussed, by seeking “best practices” from the mar-
itime ﬁeld and beyond it. Proactive management approaches are
applied inter alia in the nuclear industry [30], aviation [31], cli-
mate science [32], and ﬁsheries management [33]. The authors
examine the procedures of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of
the nuclear industry as an example of a highly advanced proactive
safety management approach. Deﬁning the total allowable catch
(TAC) for ﬁsheries in the EU provides an example of a governance
framework involving scientists, policy makers, and stakeholders.
Finally, the Prince William Sound (PWS) case from the maritime
ﬁeld demonstrates how stakeholder involvement in risk manage-
ment has been actively utilized in improving maritime safety.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the GoF
area. Section 3 provides theoretical considerations for proactive
safety management, and Section 4 presents the selected examples.
In Sections 5 and 6 the authors derive ideas from the examples,
and discuss the prerequisites, challenges, and potential beneﬁts of
establishing a formal risk governance framework for the GoF.
Section 7 is for conclusions. The paper is grounded on an extensive
literature review.2. The Gulf of Finland and its safety regime
The GoF, the easternmost basin of the Baltic Sea (Fig. 1), is one
of the most trafﬁcked sea areas in the world. For instance, in 2012,
41,005 ships crossed the pre-deﬁned Automatic Identiﬁcation
System (AIS) passage lines in the GoF, including 7549 tankers. In
the whole Baltic Sea, there were 407,425 AIS crossings, of which
about 52% were by cargo vessels, 16% by tankers, 16% by other
ships, and 9% by passenger ships [34].
According to the most recent estimations, about 160 million
tons of oil and oil products is transported via the GoF per year [35].
The majority of them are exported from Russia, which exports one
third of all its oil via the GoF [36]. As Russia's oil production and
exports are growing, it has been estimated that oil volumes being
transported via the GoF may even reach nearly 200 Mt in the near
future [35].eters, and is 400 km long and 48–135 km wide.
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tions in the GoF has raised concerns about shipping accidents.
Routes are narrow and cross each other in the middle of the Gulf,
and the seaﬂoor is rocky, and in places very shallow [5]. Ice con-
ditions and limited hours of daylight in winter and autumn pose
additional challenges, especially for ships with crews not used to
navigating in ice [37].
Statistics reveal that the GoF is one of the most accident-prone
areas in the Baltic Sea. Between 2004 and 2012, 14% (54) of all
reported collisions and 13% (54) of all groundings in the Baltic Sea
occurred in the GoF [34], although the area concerned is only 8.5%
of the whole Baltic Sea. The yearly number of collisions and
groundings in the GoF varied between 0 and 15, and 2 and 13,
respectively.
The ecosystem of the GoF is vulnerable to the effects of oil spills
[38,6,34]. Owing to low salinity, the aquatic biota involves both
saline and freshwater species, yet biodiversity is fairly low and
food-webs simple [38,6,39]. There are several threatened species
and conservation areas in the GoF, which is also an important
migratory route for arctic birds [40–42]. The dense Finnish archi-
pelago, seasonality, and ice cover in winter can severly impede
dealing with oil spills [43,44]. Further, as the water volume is
small and the renewal time of water masses fairly long [45,46], any
harmful substances can be expected to persist in the GoF ecosys-
tem for a long time.
In the globally orientated maritime safety regime, the regional
role of the HELCOM in the Baltic Sea is signiﬁcant. As part of its
aim to protect the marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all
sources of pollution, the HELCOM aims to protect the sea from the
impacts of shipping [47]. It collects data related to maritime trafﬁc,
accidents and oil transportation, gives recommendations related to
maritime safety and pollution from ships, and coordinates multi-
lateral response in case of major maritime incidents. The HEL-
COM's recommendations are not legally binding, but are usually
implemented by states [7]. The HELCOM has ﬁve interrelated
advisory working groups [48]. Two of them focus on maritime
issues: the Maritime Working Group (WG Maritime) and the
Response Group (WG Response). WG Maritime aims at ensuring
that the IMO's and other adopted regulations are observed and
enforced effectively and uniformly, and identifying and promoting
actions to limit pollution from ships and to enhance safe naviga-
tion. For this, it organizes meetings once a year in which
representatives of inter-governmental organizations, non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs), maritime transportation authorities,
and pollution incident response organizations participate. WG
Maritime's subgroup, the HELCOM Group of Experts on the Safety
of Navigation (Safe Nav) seeks to enhance navigational safety
through regional cooperation in exchanging information, discuss-
ing and proposing measures, and providing feedback and ex-
pertize [49]. The other subgroup, HELCOM AIS administers a
centralized HELCOM AIS database that records shipping trafﬁc in
the Baltic Sea. WG Response meets three times every two years, to
ensure a swift national and international response to maritime
pollution incidents, and to coordinate surveillance regarding sea-
based pollution.
In 2007, the HELCOM launched the Baltic Sea Action Plan
(BSAP) to restore the good ecological status of the Baltic marine
environment, and to provide a real basis for the HELCOM's work.
In addition to aims related to reducing eutrophication and ha-
zardous substances, and improving the status of biodiversity in the
Baltic Sea, the program aims at enhancing the environmental
friendliness of maritime activities in the Baltic Sea [50,2,51]. The
BSAP is supported by the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
(EUSBSR) [52], which promotes cooperation between stakeholders
and sectors, in order to improve the environmental condition of
the sea. The objectives of the EUSBSR include making the BalticSea a leading region for maritime safety and security, and clean
shipping.
The Baltic Sea (except for its Russian waters) is one of 13 areas
worldwide that the IMO has designated as a Particularly Sensitive
Sea Area (PSSA) that needs special protection from the hazards of
shipping [19,53]. Other PSSA areas are inter alia the Great Barrier
Reef (Australia), the Wadden Sea (Denmark, Germany, and The
Netherlands) and the Galapagos Archipelago (Ecuador) [54]. The
PSSA status justiﬁes speciﬁc measures that are approved and
adopted by the IMO, to be used to control maritime activities in
the area. The measures can relate for example to routeing, ship
reporting, or discharge and equipment requirements for ships
[54]. Since the designation in 2005, directly PSSA-associated pro-
tective measures have not been implemented in the GoF, but in the
Southern Baltic Sea the status has brought trafﬁc separation
schemes, a deep-water route, and areas to be avoided [53]. The
need for the PSSA system has been seen as an additional sign of
the failure of international regulation in addressing regional/local
shipping conditions [19,13].
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SO-
LAS) of the IMO recommends Vessel Trafﬁc Services (VTS) for areas
in which the volume of trafﬁc or the risk of accident is high [55]. In
the GoF, automated VTS centers have operated in Helsinki, St.
Petersburg, and Tallinn since the 1990s [56,7]. Their purpose is to
interact with vessel trafﬁc and respond to trafﬁc situations in their
operational area, in order to improve the safety and efﬁciency of
trafﬁc and to protect the environment. A mandatory ship reporting
system (GOFREP) for monitoring ship movements in the interna-
tional waters of the GoF was established under the framework of
the IMO in 2004 [53]. Recently, a regional project led by a private
foundation has developed an Enhanced Navigation Support In-
formation (ENSI) service for the GoF [57,58]. The ENSI service aims
at enhancing information exchange regarding, for example, routes
and weather conditions between ships and the VTS center, and it is
currently in test use. Piloting, which is regulated nationally, is
compulsory in the GoF within deﬁned pilotage areas for all tankers
that carry dangerous cargo. Pilotage services, as with ice-breaking
assistance services, are organized by the coastal states [7].
Elevated concern about shipping accidents in the GoF has also
seen a response in the form of investments in the ability to re-
spond to pollution and in salvage operations. Finland, for instance,
has altogether 19 oil-combating vessels capable of recovering oil
independently at sea, and additional assistance can be requested
from neighboring countries and the European Maritime Safety
Agency (EMSA) [59]. The Contracting Parties of the HELCOM also
have regular joint oil response exercises. In addition, three in-
cident and near-miss reporting systems have been established in
the Baltic Sea area during the 2000s, to provide insights about
conditions in which errors take place: one in Denmark (Nearmiss.
dk), one in Sweden (Insjö), and one in Finland (ForeSea). Their
signiﬁcance in terms of safety management has, however, been
minor as seafarers’ motivation to report problems is low due, for
example, to the blame culture that still exists within the maritime
industry [60,61].
Research related to shipping safety and related risks in the GoF
has been active during the 2000s. These studies have (1) assessed
the causes and likelihood of shipping accidents [62.5.63], (2) ana-
lyzed the consequences of accidents for ships and/or passengers
[64–66]), or the ecosystem [67,6], and (3) evaluated risk control
options and provided recommendations for policy [28,68–73].
Several studies have focussed on oil combating [43,44,74], incident
reporting [60,61], and safety policy instruments [13,75].
Of the above mentioned, the studies by Hänninen et al. [69]
and Jalonen and Tirkkonen [70] were commissioned by govern-
ment authorities responsible for maritime safety, and explicitly
followed the FSA's steps; the ﬁrst mentioned was also submitted
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bound into actual policy processes. The studies are highly relevant
for maritime safety in the GoF, but their direct impact on policy
making has not been analyzed.3. Safety and risk
Safety means that people understand risks and the ways in
which their system's defenses can break, and are prepared to face
such risks [76–78]. Several deﬁnitions for risk exist, most of which
refer to the uncertainty or likelihood, and consequences of an
(undesirable) event that potentially threatens the achievement of
the objectives of a system [79,80]. Speciﬁcally, safety thus implies
that actors understand the nature, likelihood and consequences of
events that may threaten their system, and are prepared for them.
‘Understanding’ implies (formally or informally) identifying, as-
sessing and evaluating risks, whereas ‘preparing to face them’
refers to deciding how to control them. A proactive approach to
maritime safety therefore means a shift of focus from prescriptive
rules towards exploring risks. A system is considered safe if the
likelihood of the occurrence of an undesirable event is judged to
be low and/or its consequences considered to be tolerable. If risks
are seen to be intolerable, measures must be taken to decrease
them.
A formal risk assessment or management process involves four
basic phases: (1) Identifying risks, and outlining perspectives,
methodologies and objectives to assess and manage them;
(2) analyzing causal factors behind risks and assessing the like-
lihood of the occurrence and potential consequences of such risks;
(3) characterizing risks based on knowledge, evaluating the in-
tolerability/tolerability/acceptability of risks based on values, and
considering the need to ban or reduce risks to a desirable or to an
‘as low as is reasonably practical’ (ALARP) level using pre-deﬁned
criteria, and evaluating risk control options; (4) deciding and im-
plementing measures to reduce risks [79–81]. Risk communication
refers to the transfer, exchange, or sharing of data, information and
knowledge about risks and their assessment and management by
all concerned [79–81]. The FSA's guidelines include the basic steps
of risk management but, as a scientiﬁc practice disconnected from
maritime reality and only targeted at the IMO's decision makers,
they do not pay attention to risk communication [22,82].
Conventionally, managing large-scale public policy problems
has been the responsibility of professionals and authorities. In
ﬁelds dealing with uncertain, complex and ambiguous problems, a
change is taking place away from top-down approaches towards
involving stakeholders in policy processes [83,84]. The aim is to
improve the understanding of the problems, strengthen the ac-
ceptance of decisions, and enhance trust [85,86]. The importance
of dialog with interested parties is highlighted in the principles of
the European Governance [87], and also included in the BSAP and
EUSBSR programs [50,52]. In policy making related to maritime
safety, participatory approaches are still rare.
Renn [88–90], Renn and Walker [91] and Aven and Renn [79]
(etc.) present an analytical framework, currently promoted by the
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) [92], for dealing
with public systemic risks, that is, risks that cross boundaries
between the environment, society and human health, and be-
tween nations and sectors, and that have both factual and socio-
cultural dimensions. The framework stresses that judgments of
risk depend on perspective and context, and that therefore dif-
ferent types of knowledge and values must be addressed when
assessing and evaluating risks. For combining scientiﬁc evidence
with socio-cultural and economic considerations, the framework
engages all relevant stakeholders in the governing of risks. In
current literature, the concept of governance is widely used todescribe collective decision making as distinct from or as opposed
to government- or authority-centered ruling, that is, governing
[79] and [86]. The risk governance framework redeﬁnes risk as
“uncertainty about and severity of the consequences (or out-
comes) of an activity with respect to something that humans va-
lue”, and stresses the importance of risk communication in ac-
knowledging the stakeholders’ role in dealing with risks, and in
bridging different views of risks. Slovic [93] and Burgman [94] also
stress the importance of value judgments in risk management.4. What can be learned from other risk-prone industries?
4.1. Proactive safety management in the nuclear industry
In the nuclear industry, safety is managed, and regulated, in a
risk-informed way by combining up-to-date probabilistic risk as-
sessment (PRA), also called probabilistic safety assessment (PSA),
with successive defense-in-depth safety measures [30,95–,99]. In a
risk-based system, safety decisions would be solely based on PRA.
The PRA provides a thorough understanding of the nuclear power
plant as an integrated socio-technical system, its failure modes
and uncertainties. It allows the locating of weaknesses in the
safety system and the allocation of resources to correct the
problems.
PRA means building accident scenarios to assess risks related to
an individual power plant, using event or fault trees or other logic
diagrams. All the evidence available and expert judgment is used
to determine potential events that might lead to nuclear fuel da-
mage and to estimate their probabilities (Level 1); to assess the
magnitude, probability and timing of a release of radioactive
substances (Level 2); and to assesses the consequent risk to people
and the environment (Level 3) [100,101,98]. The risks are eval-
uated against pre-deﬁned risk acceptance criteria [81]. For in-
stance, in Finland, the power companies must show that their
safety measures accomplish the requirements for level 1 and level
2, whereas a PRA for level 3 is not required [98]. If the deﬁned
limit for accepted risk is violated, expert judgment, brain storming,
or written guidelines are used for proposing strategies to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level. The most appropriate measure to
avert, control or minimize the risk is selected through subjective
judgments, supplemented by formal techniques (e.g. cost-beneﬁt/
risk effectiveness/multi-objective decision analysis) [81]. The im-
pact of the implemented strategy is monitored and measured over
time, and adjustments and revisions are made if necessary. The
PRA is continuously updated (Living PRA), which makes risk
management a continuous cyclical process [,81,102,97]. In addition
to the PRA, the nuclear ﬁeld utilizes qualitative risk matrices, that
is, a verbal description of probabilities and of any consequences, in
safety management [81].
As nuclear power is based on scientiﬁc research and high-level
engineering, nuclear safety management is expert-driven work
conducted by analysts, managers, reviewers, and government au-
thorities. Conducting the PRA is the responsibility of the organi-
zation operating the nuclear power plant. A peer review of the PRA
by independent experts and/or national radiation and nuclear
safety authorities is an essential part of the process [96–,98]. The
importance of public participation, stakeholder consultation and
deliberation procedures is, however, acknowledged as a way to
enhance the transparency and accountability of the processes and
the robustness and legitimacy of decisions, in particular in policy
processes related to the siting of nuclear power plants or nuclear
waste [1,03,104].
Preparing and conducting a PRA requires using both internal
(plant operations) and external (e.g. environmental conditions)
information as well as state-of-the art methods, scientiﬁc
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far-reaching information systems by the industry, including com-
munication both within the nuclear facility and between its em-
ployees and outside stakeholders is therefore important
[1,06,102,81]. The PRA as such is an important tool of commu-
nication between the nuclear power companies and the govern-
ment authorities responsible for nuclear safety. Efﬁcient risk
communication can enhance the trust of both the general public
and the employees in an individual nuclear power plant and in the
whole nuclear sector [103]. Within the nuclear community, efﬁ-
cient communication is associated with a positive safety culture
[1,02,107]. The term ‘safety culture’ was introduced by the nuclear
sector after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, and it refers to an
organizational atmosphere in which safety is understood and ac-
cepted as the number one priority. The Fukushima nuclear acci-
dent in 2011 is an example of a communication failure between
nuclear reactor experts and earthquake scientists, which led to
tsunami predictions being ignored, although the tsunami risk was
known [1,08,109].
4.2. Structured information ﬂows in ﬁsheries management
In ﬁsheries policy making, the importance of involving stake-
holders in policy processes has been increasingly understood
during the 2000s [110]. Participation is seen as a way both to
create a socially robust knowledge base for management and to
enhance trust towards decision-making processes [111–113]. In
2004, the European Council decided to establish six regional ad-
visory councils (RAC) in which 2/3 of the seats were occupied by
the ﬁshing industry and 1/3 by other stakeholder groups, to help
meet management goals through enhanced communication be-
tween stakeholders [114]. The advisory role of the RACs basically
mandate stakeholders to take part in knowledge generation and in
the evaluation of management options, but their contribution has
been limited to commenting on pre-deﬁned management propo-
sals informed by scientiﬁc advice [113]. Still, ﬁsheries management
in the EU provides an example of a governance framework with
structured information ﬂows between scientiﬁc, policy making,
and stakeholder organizations, and in particular a formal way of
including stakeholders in policy making.
Fisheries management deals with the risk of overﬁshing and
the collapse of commercially important ﬁsh stocks. The main EU-
level management measure to control this risk is the total allow-
able catch (TAC), which is the largest yearly catch that a ﬁsh stock
is assumed to be able to sustain. The TAC is deﬁned in an annual
(or bi-annual) policy process that includes assessing the biological
status of the stock and its implications for ﬁshing, and considering
how the risks related to the stock can be reduced.
The process starts with a request by the European Commis-
sion's (EC) Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
(DGMARE) for scientiﬁc management advice for a ﬁsh stock, from
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). In
the ICES, speciﬁc expert groups assess the ﬁsh stocks using dif-
ferent methods, and the assessments are reviewed by scientiﬁc
peers. Most of the methods do not represent risk assessment in
the strict sense, but the current requirements of the ecosystem-
based management and the precautionary principle imply a need
to develop methods capable of addressing uncertainty and the
associated risk, that is, methods that enable managers to take
uncertainty into account in decision making [,33,115]. For this
purpose, stock assessment applications utilizing for example the
potential of Bayesian statistics have been developed [116–118].
Expert groups together with the Advisory Committee (ACOM) of
the ICES evaluate the status of the stock against the agreed harvest
control rule (maximum sustainable yield, MSY, stock speciﬁc re-
ference points), and provide management advice to the DGMARE.Within the EU, the combined stock assessment and biological
management advice is reviewed by the Scientiﬁc and Technical
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) that potentially adds economic
information to its review report. The relevant RAC expresses the
stakeholders’ view(s) on the advice and its impact on the ﬁsh
stock, ﬁshing, and the ﬁshing industry's livelihood. Formal meth-
ods for including stakeholder views both in framing a ﬁshery
management problem, and in stock assessment have been recently
developed [1,19,118], but they have not yet been applied in the
policy processes. Based on the scientiﬁc advice, and the statements
of the STECF and the RAC, the DGMARE ﬁnally considers the tol-
erability of the risk, and makes a decision proposal for the Min-
isterial Council. The process ends with the Ministerial Council
deﬁning the TAC for the stock for the next year. The decision must
be consistent with the Common Fisheries Policy and possible
species-speciﬁc agreements [120].
Communication between the EC, ICES, and the RACs follows a
formalized line, which is deﬁned each year in a Memorandum of
Understanding [121] and in the Terms of References (ToR) [122].
They include guidelines inter alia for the form and content of the
scientiﬁc advice and of the working group report that the ICES
delivers to the DGMARE. In addition to the catch status and advice,
the ICES is required to inform the EU about the origins and causes
of uncertainty in the scientiﬁc advice, and about the methods of
the assessment and advisory procedure [1,21,122]. In order to
improve and enhance communication with stakeholders and the
general public, the ICES currently prepares an easy-to-read digest
of the ofﬁcial ICES advice [123].
4.3. Stakeholder committee managing maritime risks in Prince Wil-
liam Sound
In 1989, the oil tanker the Exxon Valdez grounded in Prince
William Sound in Alaska, and spilled an estimated 11 million
gallons of crude oil into the sea [16]. This caused public and gov-
ernment concern about the safety of oil transportation in the area,
and led to the implementation of several measures, such as
weather-based closures, passage restrictions, and the usage of
escort tugs, to reduce the risk of an oil spill.
In 1995, a Steering Committee involving a broad range of sta-
keholders (shipping companies, government, the oil industry, local
industries, local citizens, representatives of environmental con-
servation, the coast guard, etc.) was formed for developing a risk
management plan for the PWS region and for evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of the implemented and new risk intervention mea-
sures [124,16,125]. It was deemed important that both a sub-
stantive knowledge of and the different interests and values re-
lated to oil transportation and the ecosystem were covered. The
Steering Committee deﬁned the aims, main concepts (such as
“undesirable event”) and temporal and areal focus of the risk as-
sessment, and outlined methodologies. It also provided expertize
in identifying the risks and risk control options to be evaluated.
The risk assessment was expected to estimate the frequency of
accidents involving an oil tanker per year in deﬁned locations
[124,16,125]. Consultant analysts were hired to conduct the risk
assessment. The analysts built accident scenarios using PRA (fault
trees, event trees) that sought to capturing the dynamic nature of
risk in oil transportation. The frequency of occurrence of each
casualty was estimated using a system simulation model, and the
effect of organizational and situational factors on the triggering of
incidents and accidents was elicited from experts. The con-
sequences of accidents were estimated using an oil outﬂow model
[124,16,125]. The acceptability and tolerability of oil accident risks
in PWS was determined by the Steering Committee based on the
risk assessment, and on information related to the costs, feasibility,
and social aspects of the risks and risk reduction measures. Finally,
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were evaluated by using an integrated system risk-simulation
model [124,16,125].
The Steering Committee members were educated in the lan-
guage and modeling of risk, to facilitate discussion [125]. The
analysts reported the results of the risk assessment to the Steering
Committee monthly in the form of accident scenarios, and a ﬁnal
report that included technical documentation of the methodology,
results, and recommendations. The Steering Committee wrote
joint press brieﬁngs and implemented the recommendations
[125]. It was reported, that the stakeholder involvement facilitated
the building of a common understanding of oil transportation
risks, enhanced trust, and supported the implementation of the
decisions, but that it also challenged the objectivity of the analysis
and independence of the analysts, and led to compromises
[126,16,125]. The study has also been criticized for not addressing
uncertainty in its results [127].
Still, the process was successful in reducing risks. The risk
model indicated that the actions that the stakeholders had takenFig. 2. The proposed framework. In addition to IMO-regulated global (red) and regional
adopted locally/regionally (white). The best practices for developing a proactive risk gov
from nuclear risk management), decision-making based on scientiﬁc advice (EU ﬁsherie
PWS case). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the readeprior to the study had reduced the risk of an oil spill by 75%. New
measures identiﬁed during the process were assessed to reduce
accident frequency by an additional 68%. This included using an
enhanced-capability tug to escort oil tankers, a change to a tanker
route, managing interactions between ﬁshing vessels and tankers
by the VTS, increasing the number of bridge crew on board escort
tugs, and the production of long-term quality assurance and safety
management plans by shipping companies. The project fostered a
cooperative risk management atmosphere involving all stake-
holders, and resulted in the acceptance of the results of the study
by all stakeholders and the acceptance of high levels of investment
to reduce the risk of further oil spills [,16,125]. Today, the en-
vironmentally safe operation of the Valdez Marine Terminal and
associated tankers is promoted by a stakeholder council, although
risk assessments are not a systematic part of the council's work
[128]. Grabowski [129] provided recommendations for the council
regarding a new or updated risk assessment in PSW.(pink) regulative measures there is a need for maritime safety measures that can be
ernance framework include regarding maritime safety as a holistic system (adopted
s management), and the active role of different stakeholders in governing risks (the
r is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Maritime risks are to a great extent of a local or regional nature.
Environmental conditions (waterways, marine weather, visibility,
trafﬁc density/volume, etc.), in addition to human and technical
factors, are major causes of maritime accidents [130,5]. The local/
regional environment is also a major victim of accidents, the
consequences of which must be withstood and taken care of by
the local society. The local or regional dimension of risks is par-
ticularly evident in gulfs, bays, straits, fjords, and other rather
enclosed sea areas, where the accident risk is considerable and an
accident occurring anywhere concerns the whole area and its
people, like in the GoF. In such areas, the systemic nature of risks is
pronounced: they do not only concern the ships, ship owners, and
the humans and cargo onboard, but the regional environment,
inhabitants, societies and nations around the sea area. The inter-
national policy regime is not adequate for managing systemic re-
gional risks, and thus a regional framework involving a strong
stakeholder contribution is needed.
Here, “best practices” for a maritime risk governance frame-
work for the GoF are discussed and proposed, based on the ex-
amples described above (Fig. 2). The nuclear risk management
sees a power plant as a holistic system consisting of human and
technical parts inﬂuenced by internal and external factors, and has
developed advanced techniques for anticipating system weak-
nesses that potentially threaten safety. The TAC decision process in
the EU provides an example of a formal way of making decisions
based on both scientiﬁc advice and stakeholders' views. Finally,
the PWS case proves that stakeholder participation in governing
risks can be both feasible and beneﬁcial for maritime safety.
First, establishing a permanent stakeholder committee is pro-
posed, for contributing to or even taking responsibility for risk
governance, as in the PWS case (Fig. 3). For instance, the HELCOM
working groups could be developed into a direction of permanent
stakeholder involvement. A broad range of stakeholders (ship
companies, crews, maritime safety authorities, pilots, the oil in-
dustry, port employees, environmental authorities and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, local citizens and scientists) allows the
different types of knowledge required for a comprehensive iden-
tiﬁcation of risks and risk control options, and the relevant values
for both the evaluation of risks and the discussion about the need
for actions to reduce them to be brought in. The involvement and
support of the IMO and EU/EMSA would be required for con-
sidering the regional risks and their management in the interna-
tional context.Fig. 3. A novel approach to enhance maritime safety in the GoF. A permanent stakehold
conducts regional risk assessments. Assessments exploit a comprehensive risk database
also include knowledge from different stakeholders. Risk assessments are based on joint
risk assessments and update their own understanding of risks. Enhanced communicatioSecond, a scientiﬁc body is required for conducting risk as-
sessment. Potential organizations for this are, for example, the
HELCOM, which already has a role in dealing with maritime safety
in the Baltic Sea, or the ICES, which is experienced in risk assess-
ment related to the marine environment and its living resources.
On the initiative of the authors of this paper, the ICES recently took
the ﬁrst step towards this, by establishing the “Working Group on
the Risks of Maritime Activities in the Baltic Sea” (WGMABS),
which started operating in the spring of 2015. As for individual
states, in Finland, for example, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency
(TRAFI) has recently developed its analysis activities.
Third, risk assessments require up-to-date information of re-
gional risks. Currently, the most obvious source for identifying
risks is the incident and near miss reporting systems. Focusing risk
identiﬁcation on hazards that have materialized in the past,
however, leads to a bias towards historical data instead of being
proactive [82]. A proactive approach thus requires establishing a
novel risk database for reporting any kinds of potentially unsafe
acts or conditions by a wide variety of users (shipping companies,
seafarers, pilots, the Vessel Trafﬁc Service (VTS) and the Automatic
Identiﬁcation System (AIS) operators, Flag State and Port State
control inspectors, classiﬁcation societies, authorities, ﬁshing in-
dustry, boaters and other leisure users, local citizens). A ‘risk da-
tabase’ would imply a shift from lagging indicators to leading
indicators.
It can also be considered if information regarding unusual si-
tuations and conditions is sufﬁcient for a risk assessment, or if data
regarding normal situations is also needed, like in the nuclear
sector. Developing monitoring practices and associated indicators
for measuring safety performance and the effect of implemented
decisions might help identify risk factors that remain hidden in
reports focusing on assumed risks. Establishing systems with valid
indicators for monitoring safety would also support a cyclical risk
assessment process.
Fourth, a proactive approach requires developing a method that
enables assessing both current and future risks under uncertainty,
and using it in cyclical processes as in the nuclear sector, to keep
the understanding of risks updated. In the maritime ﬁeld, a risk
assessment typically concerns events or conditions potentially
leading to an accident and the most accident-prone spots in the
area, the probabilities of the events/conditions, and the con-
sequences of an accident to the ship, to people and the environ-
ment. The nuclear industry uses event trees and fault trees in
building accident scenarios, and they were also applied in the PWS
case. In the Baltic Sea area, the use of Bayesian belief networks
(BBNs) is well advanced in risk assessments related to shippinger committee communicates actively with and offers input to a scientiﬁc body that
, which include data from several other databases, reporting systems, etc., and can
ly agreed risk levels. Scientists and other stakeholders can learn from the results of
n is essential for successful risk management.
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the integration of quantitative and qualitative knowledge in as-
sessing uncertain future events in a holistic way, and the updating
of prior knowledge when new information is available, to get an
improved (posterior) understanding of the problem. The method
can also be used as a decision support tool. Hänninen [133] dis-
cusses the beneﬁts and challenges of using Bayesian networks for
maritime trafﬁc accident prevention. Inter alia the IMO [22,82] and
Aven and Renn [79] propose a number of other risk assessment
methods. Rosqvist and Tuominen [134] discuss the role of a peer
review in qualifying a FSA study.
Fifth, risk assessment criteria, and an acceptable and tolerable
level of risks must be agreed. The criteria are used for evaluating
loss, and deﬁning limits for acceptable risk to individuals (fatal-
ities, injuries, ill health), society (risk to society as a whole or local
communities or ports), and the environment (e.g. accidental re-
leases of oil and oil products). Criteria, and their mutual weighting,
are also needed for ranking alternative risk-controlling measures
in relation to one another. In addition, criteria are required for
deﬁning the cost-effectiveness of risk management, or acceptable
costs in relation to expected beneﬁts, [82,135–140]. Laurila-Pant
et al. [141] discuss approaches to placing a value on the ecosystem
in case of, for example, an oil accident or other serious accidents in
the sea. An important topic to be discussed by the stakeholders
and/or the society is how to share the costs involved in decreasing
the risks between the public and the private sector.
Sixth, both the theoretical part of our paper and the practical
examples that we have presented highlight the signiﬁcance of
communication in risk governance. A formal process of risk
identiﬁcation, assessment, evaluation, and management ensures
information ﬂows between stakeholders, and between the stake-
holder organization, the scientiﬁc body conducting the risk as-
sessment, the EU, and the IMO, as takes place in the TAC for-
mulation process of the EU. In addition, informal risk commu-
nication between all those involved is required for identifying,
discussing and sharing information about risks and for observing,
monitoring, reporting and discussing the effects of the im-
plemented policy instruments in a continuous process. A risk as-
sessment report would disseminate relevant ﬁndings and justiﬁed
recommendations for all stakeholders, in particular seafarers,
shipping companies, decision makers, the EU, and the IMO. It
would also give feedback to those that reported risks, to show that
their concerns have been responded to. This is expected to support
reporting and further the development of scientiﬁc practices to
support decision making.6. Beneﬁts and challenges
The proposal presented above brings the FSA approach ad-
vocated by the IMO from the international to the regional level,
and develops it from a task solely conducted by scientiﬁc experts
towards a participatory procedure involving stakeholders. Gov-
erning risks at the regional level can be advantageous because
local actors have an interest in protecting their own sea areas and
in investing in managing the associated risks, as shown both in the
PWS and in the GoF area. In addition, the proposal enhances the
FSA from an occasional “when deemed necessary” practice to a
regular procedure to be used systematically as the basis of decision
making. A FSA that focuses on regional risks may be more man-
ageable than a generic one both in terms of scope and time used
for the risk assessment and management processes.
A regional-level risk governance framework enables one to
focus on real, regionally relevant safety threats and to ﬁnd the
most appropriate measures to manage them before disasters oc-
cur. Thus it can produce tailor-made safety measures that may bemore effective and cost-effective than the “one size ﬁts all” type of
IMO regulations that mostly concentrate on ship safety, and less
on issues external to a ship [28,7]. Regional policy making can
develop PSSA-type regulatory safety measures related, for ex-
ample, to routing or pilotage, special requirements for ports or for
ships entering the area, trafﬁc control, inspection, emergency
preparedness, or navigation support tools like the ENSI system, but
the measures can also be recommendations to shipping compa-
nies, crews, ports, or other actors, regarding information sharing,
education, safety performance, communication, auditing or
something else that has been found to be signiﬁcant in the risk
assessment. In addition, a regional governance approach can en-
hance cooperation between regional authorities and thereby har-
monize and decrease overlapping procedures in, for instance, in-
spections. Regional-level risk governance can also feed informa-
tion and recommendations to the IMO, to be used in generic policy
making. Risk governance at a smaller scale enables a constant
learning process about risks, and has the potential to improve the
preparedness of both the administration and the seafarers to react
more quickly and more efﬁciently to them.
It is, however, evident that a regional maritime risk governance
approach cannot operate separately from international rules and
that international prescriptive regulations cannot be overridden.
Thus a regional proactive approach to maritime safety is necessarily
risk-informed by nature. This means that regional risk management
could complement international prescriptive rules, not replace
them. Critical issues to be considered include, for example,
(a) Which body, and at what level, should implement the re-
commended management measures? (b) What are the legal rights
underpinning, and the economic, technical, and other resources to
implement the actions? (c) Can regional measures be decided and
adopted regionally or is the review and approval of the IMO re-
quired? In the current situation, the principle of the freedom of
navigation and the harmonizing role of the IMO in the maritime
safety regime may not easily give way to regional safety measures.
Thus, implementing regional regulations may require long nego-
tiation processes between policy levels, concerning, for example,
whether the intended policy instruments conform to international
regulations and whether the IMO is willing to approve them [11].
The proposed framework develops policy making from pure
prescriptive ruling towards a more transparent bottom-up ap-
proach based on efﬁcient communication. It has the potential to
build an understanding of maritime safety as a holistic system
consisting of technical, human, and environmental components,
improve the commitment of seafarers to the agreed policies,
generate trust, and support social learning [142–145]. Further, it
can enhance a positive safety culture within the shipping industry,
and thereby support risk reporting, decrease human failures, and
break the blame culture [78,146,60,147,61]. A direct inﬂuence on
the safety culture, and corporate social responsibility of shipping
companies can even decrease the need for regulatory policy in-
struments [1,48,149]. However, it must be remembered that sta-
keholder participation as such is neither necessarily a guarantee of
success, nor a panacea for solving problems related to maritime
safety, and that, overall, evidence of the impact of stakeholder
involvement on decision making is often lacking, outdated or in-
appropriate. Therefore, in order to satisfy the requirements of the
process and the parties, the form of involving stakeholders must
be commonly deﬁned, and their actual performance evaluated.
Learning lessons from failures such as the examples provided in
this paper can greatly beneﬁt planning.
7. Conclusions
The Baltic Sea area provides a fertile ground for the establish-
ment of novel regional forms for maritime governance. The
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restoring the good ecological status of the Baltic Sea, and, as part of
this, making it a leading region in maritime safety. They also in-
corporate the principle of involving stakeholders in policy making
upheld by the EU. In the Baltic Sea area, public environmental
awareness is relatively high, and most stakeholders are willing to
promote maritime safety. Political decisions, and mandates from
the IMO and the EU are all that is required, as well as commit-
ments from both the public and the private sector regarding ﬁ-
nance. We expect that a well documented and open risk govern-
ance framework would be supported by inter alia oil companies, as
it is in no-one's interest to get involved in a large-scale oil
accident.
A regional maritime risk governance framework would not
only provide a forum for addressing the safety risks of shipping. It
also provides the potential for enlarging stakeholder collaboration
to other environmental issues related to shipping, such as sewage
pollution, illegal discharges, the introduction of alien species, air
pollution, and security issues, and even to other sectors affecting
the sea, such as aquaculture, ﬁshing, wind energy, leisure boating,
and agriculture. Multi-sector stakeholder collaboration would re-
inforce the coordination of interrelated problems and facilitate the
formation of an integrated approach to maritime spatial planning,
which is seen as a key to governing the fragile Baltic Sea [150].
A shift of focus in maritime safety policy formulation from the
prescriptive and reactive approach towards proactive approaches will
probably take place. This paper proposed an approach based on
identifying, assessing and managing risks. Another future path may
be related to the Safety II approach [1,51,152]. It is grounded on
performance adjustments and resilience engineering, that is, learning
from events that go right and managing performance variability,
rather than focusing on preventing accidents. The approach is being
introduced in ﬁelds such as aviation and healthcare as a response to
the ever more complex and automated reality that the cause-effect
models may no longer be capable of capturing [1,51,152].
In this paper, ﬁsheries, nuclear power, and the maritime ﬁeld
were referred to as examples of established risk governance
practices. Other examples, such as safety management in aviation
[31] and the railways [153] might be the next parallels worth re-
viewing. Although this paper proposed a governance framework
for the GoF, the approach could be extended to cover the whole
Baltic Sea, or applied to any small scale vulnerable sea area.Acknowledgments
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